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Abstract: This paper investigates how the departure of the father from the household, 
that results in his permanent absence, affects children’s school enrollment and work 
participation in rural Colombia. The results show that departure of the father decreases 
children’s school enrollment by around 5 percentage points and increases child labor by 3 
percentage points. The paper exploits the roll-out of a conditional cash transfer program 
during the period of study and shows that it counteracts these adverse effects. This, and 
other pieces of evidence provided, strongly suggests that the channel through which the 
father’s departure affects children is through reducing the income of very poor 
households, which is tightening their liquidity constraints. It also highlights the important 
safety net role played by such welfare programs, in particular for disadvantaged 
households, which are unlikely to find formal or informal ways of insuring themselves 
against such vagaries. 
 
JEL classification codes: I20, J12, J22, O16 
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A major disruption to family life can have serious consequences for children. A 
particularly traumatic event is the departure of the father from the household on a 
permanent basis. There are at least three different channels through which this can affect 
children’s human capital accumulation, and in particular their school and work 
participation (more discussion of the following points is to be found in Case, Paxson, and 
Ableidinger 2004 and Gertler, Levine, and Ames 2004). First, it is likely to involve a 
substantial income loss and this may be important for school choices in the presence of 
credit and insurance market failures. Second, the balance of decision-making power 
within the household may change, with the preferences of remaining adults gaining 
increased importance, which may have important consequences for children. Third, the 
loss of a parent can have significant emotional and psychological consequences for 
children. The importance of the first and third channels was highlighted in a World Bank 
Development Outreach report (Bell, Bruhns, and Gersbach 2006): 
“if parents sicken and die while their children are still young, then all the means 
needed to raise the children so that they can become productive and capable citizens will 
be greatly reduced. The affected families’ lifetime income will shrink, and hence also the 
means to finance the children’s education, whether in the form of school fees or taxes. On 
a parent’s death, moreover, the children will lose the love, knowledge and guidance 
which complement formal education.” 
Some countries, particularly in Africa, have put in place policies to provide 
education and health support to children who have lost one or both parents. These 
policies appear to be a response to the increase in HIV-associated mortality, which has 
resulted in millions of children losing parents to AIDS. Yet the absence of the father from 
the household whilst a child is still young is a pervasive phenomenon. Despite this, there 
is surprisingly little evidence on how children are affected by the long-term departure of 
one or more parents (exceptions are referred to below) and on how policies may protect 
them against such adversities. In this paper, we first investigate how the departure of the 
father from the household - that results in his permanent absence - affects children’s 
school enrollment and work participation in Colombia.1
Departure of the father is a relatively rare occurrence amongst our households. In 
order to focus on more permanent reductions in income, which are more difficult to 
insure against than transitory ones, we consider only departures due to death and divorce, 
which we can be confident are permanent. A central concern is that divorce or 
widowhood is not exogenous with respect to other determinants of child outcomes (see 
van de Walle 2011 for related selection issues). Previous work has attempted to exploit 
exogenous variation to overcome this problem, for instance in divorce laws (Gruber 
2004) and child sex composition (Dahl and Moretti 2008). In this paper, we provide 
several pieces of evidence which, taken together, help build confidence in the quasi-
random nature of the departure of the father. First, we show that observable 
characteristics (before the departure happened) of households in which the father did and 
did not subsequently depart are quite similar. Although reassuring, the concern remains 
 We are interested in the effects 
on children’s school and work participation because of their importance for human 
capital accumulation; moreover, child work also affects family income and current 
poverty, which is indeed the reason why we may expect it to increase in order to 
compensate for income reductions. We then exploit the roll-out of a conditional cash 
transfer (CCT) program, Familias en Acción, the purpose of which is to increase 
schooling of children from poor backgrounds, and examine the extent to which receiving 
the cash transfer program mitigates the adverse effects we find.  
that unobserved heterogeneity may differ between these two types of households. We 
deal with time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity by allowing for household fixed 
effects in a three-year panel of households. So, in line with related literature (for instance 
De Janvry et al. 2006), our empirical method assumes common trends across both types 
of household. Note that this is conditional on a set of covariates, including transitory 
income shocks, making it more credible. We assess the plausibility of this common 
trends assumption by looking at pre-departure trends in children’s schooling and per 
capita income, across households where the father does and does not subsequently depart, 
and are reassured by the fact that they do not differ significantly. To deal with 
endogeneity concerns due to potential correlation with time-varying shocks, we check 
whether divorce is correlated with recent significant time-varying shocks, including crop 
losses, business losses, and illnesses, and find that it is not. Finally, to further build 
confidence in the quasi-random nature of the departure, we carry out a falsification 
exercise by checking whether current child activities are correlated with future departure 
of the head: the idea here is that future departure should not lead to a significant effect on 
current activities if departure is effectively quasi-random. We find, reassuringly, no 
evidence that it does.  
Our main finding is that, in the setting we consider in Colombia, the father’s 
permanent absence from the household affects adversely the schooling of both boys and 
girls, and it increases their participation in paid and unpaid work. These findings are 
particularly pronounced for the relatively less well-off, who are likely to face the more 
severe liquidity constraints, and are consistent with the father’s absence affecting 
activities through the income reduction associated with it. A second key finding of the 
paper is that the conditional cash transfer program Familias en Acción helps protect 
children against the vagaries of the event: it protects their schooling and offsets the 
increased child labor after the father’s departure. The fact that the CCT program acts as a 
safety net suggests that the main impact of father’s departure is through the income loss 
associated with it. 
The paper is structured as follows. In section I, we provide a brief overview of the 
related literature. Section II describes the data that we use in this research. We discuss 
identification issues in section III and present the empirical methodology and main results 
in section IV. Section V considers whether the CCT program introduced in the 
environment we consider has cushioned the poor households in our sample against these 
effects and section VI concludes. 
I. RELATED LITERATURE 
Our work fits into a number of strands of literature. First, it is related to the 
growing literature in developing countries on parental deaths and children’s education. 
This literature investigates the importance of different channels in explaining the 
observed impacts (Case, Paxson, and Ableidinger 2004; Gertler, Levine, and Ames 2004; 
Yamano and Jayne 2005; Beegle, De Weerdt, and Dercon 2006, 2010; Evans and Miguel 
2007; van de Walle 2011). It generally finds adverse effects on schooling, particularly on 
primary school participation. This literature generally does not consider the effects on 
child labor, however - clearly an important economic activity amongst children in 
developing countries and one which may be particularly responsive to an event that 
induces a substantial income reduction. We consider permanent departure of the father 
through either death or divorce, which are the two events in our data resulting in 
substantial income reductions for households. Whilst the channels through which both 
may affect outcomes may differ,2
More generally, our work is related to the literature that considers the causal 
impacts of a family disruption on child outcomes, mainly covering the US or other 
developed countries. Whilst the literature has mainly focused on a permanent absence of 
a parent due to either death or divorce, recent work has also highlighted negative effects 
of parental migration on children’s schooling, in particular that of the father since it is 
males who migrate in most contexts (see Antman 2012 for a survey, Giannelli and 
Mangiavacchi 2010, and Lahaie et al. 2009). A key recognition throughout this literature 
is that the absence of a parent is likely to be correlated with unobserved factors, which 
may also explain the poorer outcomes of the children. Several methods have been used to 
account for the influence of such factors. For example, some have used sibling-difference 
(household fixed effects) models (Case, Lin, and McLanahan 2001; Ermisch and 
Francesconi 2001; Ginther and Pollak 2004; Gennetian 2005) taking account of the fixed 
unobservable endowments that are shared by siblings from the same family or the same 
mother; others compare children’s outcomes before and after the divorce of their parents 
(Cherlin et al. 1991; Painter and Levine, 2000), assuming that pre-existing disadvantages 
of the family or the child are captured by child fixed effects. Finally, quasi-experimental 
studies have either considered parental death as an exogenous source of parental absence 
(Biblarz and Gottainer 2000; Corak 2001; Lang and Zagorsky, 2001) or exploited 
 our empirical work suggests that it is the income 
reduction entailed that is the main driver of observed effects.  
exogenous variation in separation rates due to differences in divorce laws either across 
states (Gruber 2004) or over time (Piketty 2003). 
Our work also fits into the literature that considers the relationship between 
children’s work participation and negative income shocks in developing countries, such 
as labor market shocks (Parker and Skoufias 2006) and/or crop losses (Jacoby and 
Skoufias 1997; Guarcello, Mealli, and Rosati 2003; Dehejia and Gatti 2005; Beegle, 
Dehejia, and Gatti 2006; Dammert 2007; Duryea, Lam, and Levison 2007; Gubert and 
Robilliard 2008). In line with this literature, our results are consistent with the presence 
of credit and insurance market failures in rural Colombia.  
The second part of the paper, which provides evidence of CCT programs 
attenuating the negative income effects entailed by permanent absence of the father on 
children’s activities, fits into a growing literature on the role of CCTs as safety nets. 
Indeed, CCT programs are a fast-growing part of safety net policy, and there is evidence 
that they provide households with protection against short-term shocks, both systemic 
and idiosyncratic. For instance, De Janvry et al. (2006) show that the Mexican 
PROGRESA program fully protected children’s schooling from shocks due to 
unemployment and illness of the household head, as well as natural disasters in the 
community. Maluccio (2005) shows that the Nicaragua Red de Protección Social 
protected households’ total and food expenses and children’s school attendance against 
the effect of the Central America coffee crisis in 2000–01. More recently, Gitter, Manley, 
and Barham (2011) provide evidence of CCT programs mitigating the effects of negative 
shocks on physical development in early childhood. Our results are very much in line 
with these papers, suggesting that CCT programs provide a safety net against income 
losses. A distinctive feature of our work is that we consider income losses that are likely 
to be permanent and that are thus even more difficult to insure against than transitory 
reductions in income. 
II. DATA 
In this section, we discuss the data used in the paper and present some key 
descriptive statistics relating to our sample of interest. 
Background 
We use three years of panel data from a survey of households and individuals in 
rural Colombia. These data have been collected to evaluate the large-scale welfare 
program Familias en Acción, which has been in place in some rural areas of Colombia 
since 2002 and which has since expanded to cover urban areas. The program aims to 
alleviate poverty by fostering human capital accumulation among the poorest households 
through conditional subsidies for investments in education, nutrition, and health. 
The first wave of data collection for the evaluation of the program took place in 
2002, when around 11,500 households were interviewed. We refer to this as the baseline 
survey. A year later, after the program started, a second wave of data was collected, and a 
third wave was collected in 2006. We refer to these as the first and second follow-up 
surveys respectively. In this paper, we estimate the effects of the father’s permanent 
absence on children’s outcomes.3 The socio-economic data are rich, reflecting face-to-
face interviews that lasted on average 3.5 hours.  
Descriptive Statistics 
We follow the school and work status of the children in households with at least 
one child aged 7–14 at the baseline across the first follow-up survey (1 year later) and the 
second follow-up (3.5 years after the baseline), up until they are at most 17 years of age. 
As we are considering the effects of departure of the father since baseline, we restrict the 
sample to households in which both parents are present at baseline.4
Outcomes. We consider two outcomes - school enrollment, which relates to 
whether the individual is enrolled in school at the time of the survey, and work 
participation, which includes all types of paid and unpaid economic activities, as well as 
looking for work as a main activity.
 
5
 Looking at the proportions of our sample enrolled in 
school and participating in work, by age and gender (table 1), we see that school 
participation rates are high amongst children aged 7–11, corresponding to primary 
school.6
{Table 1 about here} 
 The first substantial drop in school enrollment is observed at age 12, at the 
transition from primary to secondary school. Another point worth noting is that school 
enrollment of females is higher than that of males. Engagement in work is around twice 
as high for males as for females, and is very low for both before the age of 12 
(participation in work is not recorded for individuals under age 10).  
Permanent absence of the father. To capture a potentially very important 
disruption to family life and a long-term reduction in income, we focus on the departure 
of the child’s father from the household since the baseline, and in particular departure 
that results in his subsequent permanent absence from the household.7 Divorce and death 
are the two reasons for permanent absences that are identifiable from the data. As they 
are relatively rare events, we pool them in order to improve statistical precision.8
To measure the incidence of divorce, we combine information on marital status of 
the child’s mother at times t–1 and t, and the status of the father at time t. In particular, if 
her marital status at time t is divorced and at time t–1 is married, and if his status at time t 
is ‘no longer in the household’, we consider this to be a divorce. Deaths, on the other 
hand, are coded directly in the survey. Departure of the father due to death or divorce has 
occurred in 5.6% of our sample of households (i.e. those with at least one 7- to 14-year-
old at baseline). Divorce accounts for 82% of such departures and death for 18% of 
them.
 One 
might be concerned that they result in different levels of transfers to the household; 
however, we checked this in our data and found that the amount of transfers received by 
the household is very similar in magnitude after death and divorce (table A1 in the 
appendix).  
9
The average age of fathers who leave the household is 43 at baseline, and it 
results in a substantial income reduction: 90% of them were working at the baseline. To 
give some idea as to the extent of the income loss associated with the departure, we 
compare total household labor earnings across households with and without an absent 
father. Total labor earnings are around 22% lower, controlling for household composition 
(number of male adults, number of female adults, number of children aged 0–6, and 
number of children aged 7–17).
  
10
 We also compare total household consumption, a more 
direct indicator of welfare of the households in our sample. It is lower by around 13% in 
households in which the father subsequently departed than in households in which he did 
not, controlling for household composition as above. Both differences are statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  
Whether such events can be fully anticipated or not, it is unlikely that the 
households in our sample have ways of fully insuring against the income losses they 
entail, in particular as they live in rural municipalities where credit and insurance markets 
are typically thin (Edmonds 2006). We also checked in our data that, although monetary 
transfers and transfers-in-kind increase significantly after the departure of the father, the 
magnitude is very small compared with the income losses it entails.11
III. IDENTIFICATION 
 Under these 
conditions, we expect paternal absence to affect the decisions to send children to school 
and/or work. In addition to this, paternal absence is likely to have a number of other 
important repercussions (see for example Gertler, Levine, and Ames 2004 for a 
discussion of these). First, the father is likely to be one of the key decision-makers in the 
household, so his departure may bring about changes in bargaining power and decision-
making within the household, which may affect children’s education and work. Second, 
the father can be an important figurehead for children. Though we cannot disentangle 
these channels with the available data, we note in anticipation of our results that the 
evidence we find is strongly consistent with income loss being the key factor affecting 
children’s activities. 
Two issues that arise in identification relate to the potential endogeneity of 
parental absence and attrition from the sample over time. In this section, we discuss each 
of these issues in turn. 
Endogeneity 
An important concern with paternal absence, and indeed one that has received 
much attention in the related literature (see for example Gruber 2004), is that it may not 
be exogenous to the outcomes of interest - children’s work and schooling. For instance, 
couples may split up due to having different preferences over investment in children, in 
which case we may be picking up the effects of preferences rather than divorce per se.12
{Table 2 about here} 
 
Whilst it is reassuring that pre-departure (i.e. baseline) observed characteristics of 
households that do and do not go on to experience departure of the father are quite 
similar, as shown in table 2 (differences are mainly in relation to education of the head of 
household), it is clearly important to address endogeneity concerns. 
In the empirical work, we deal with these concerns in two ways. First, we control 
for time-invariant unobserved confounding factors through household fixed effects. 
Accordingly, our identification strategy relies on the assumption that the time trends are 
the same in households where the father does and does not depart, the plausibility of 
which we look at in detail below. Second, to address the concern that there may be time-
varying factors correlated with father’s departure and child outcomes, we assess the 
relationship between divorce and observed time-varying shocks, including crop losses, 
business losses, and illnesses, and also control for such time-varying shocks in the 
analysis to improve the conditional exogeneity of paternal departure. 
To examine the plausibility of the common trends assumption, we look at trends 
in two key variables. First, we look at whether trends in children’s schooling were the 
same in both types of household before the father departed. We have two periods of 
school enrollment data before the departure - at baseline (2002) and the year before 
(collected retrospectively at baseline). We cannot reject that schooling trends are the 
same in both types of household, as shown by the statistically insignificant coefficient on 
the interaction between the type of household (“Absence”) and the year dummy in the 
upper panel of table 3. As a second check for common trends, we compare trends in 
household per capita income in both types of household, before the father departed. We 
have three periods of income data before the departure, all collected retrospectively at 
baseline. The evolution of per capita household labor income in the years 1999, 2000, 
and 2001 is very similar across both types of household prior to the departure (lower 
panel of table 3). This gives us no reason to believe they would not have been so if 
departure had not occurred. 
{Table 3 about here} 
It is also worth noting that the signs of the estimates in table 3 point, if anything, 
to a positive selection of the families with absent fathers in terms of schooling and 
income trends (although they are not statistically significant).13
As an additional exercise to build more confidence in the quasi-random nature of 
the absence of the father, we check whether current child activities are correlated with 
future absence of the father: future absence should not lead to a significant effect on 
current activities if departure is effectively random. To do this, we regress current 
 In this worst-case 
scenario, we would in fact underestimate the magnitude of the “true” impacts of 
departure: to pre-empt our main results, the detrimental impacts of the permanent absence 
of the father on school enrollment and work would be even more pronounced than the 
ones we find. 
children’s activities (schooling/work at time t, for t = 1,2) on future absence (at time t+1) 
and, reassuringly, find extremely small and statistically insignificant correlations between 
them (0.009 for schooling, –0.009 for work, both with p-values of 0.5).  
Whilst all of the evidence above is reassuring, it does not address concerns that 
there may be unobserved time-varying shocks affecting both the father’s permanent 
departure and child outcomes. For instance, a temporary shock to income such as a 
crop/business loss or illness may affect the quality of the marital relationship and the 
likelihood of divorce, as well as affecting child outcomes. We can gauge the importance 
of this to some extent, as households report the most important shocks in the year prior to 
the survey, including crop loss, illness, and business loss: when we check whether such 
shocks in period t–1 are correlated with divorce in period t, we find that they are not 
(table 4), which is reassuring. We also note that we control for these shocks in the 
empirical work and our point estimates of the main coefficient of interest are very similar 
with and without them. 
{Table 4 about here} 
Taken together, the above evidence helps build confidence in the quasi-random 
nature of father’s absence. We also reiterate that we control for time-invariant 
unobserved household-level characteristics and time-varying observed ones (including, 
importantly, shocks) throughout the empirical analysis.  
Attrition 
Overall, around 5% of households left the sample between the baseline survey 
and the first follow-up and an additional 8.5% of households left between the first and 
second follow-ups (3.5 years after baseline).14 Although this attrition rate is relatively 
low,15
{Table 5 about here} 
 it is a concern if the reason for leaving the sample is related to the behavior being 
modeled, as might be the case if households from which the father departs are more likely 
to drop out of the sample. To address this, we compare baseline characteristics of 
households that did and did not subsequently leave the sample (table 5). As expected, 
households that own a house are significantly less likely to attrit than those that do not; 
and those living at relatively high altitudes are more likely to attrit. Other than that, 
attrition is not systematically related to any of the variables considered in the table. 
Whilst this is reassuring, potential selection biases on the basis of unobserved 
characteristics cannot be ruled out, which we account for in our empirical work. The 
methods we use to correct for this are discussed in section IV and all results presented 
take into account this possible selection problem, although it makes little difference to the 
effects we estimate. 
IV. EFFECTS OF PERMANENT ABSENCE OF THE FATHER ON SCHOOLING AND WORK 
In this section, we present the empirical specification used to estimate the effects of 
permanent absence of the father on children’s schooling and work outcomes. We then 
show the empirical findings. 
Main Specification 
To estimate the effects of the permanent absence of the father on children’s 
school and work participation, we estimate the following model: 
(1) 1 2 3 1 4ijt jt ijt jt j t ijty D X I f uα α α α δ−′ ′= + + + + + +  
where i denotes child, j denotes household, and t denotes time, t = 1 (baseline), 2 (first 
follow-up), and 3 (second follow-up), yijt is a discrete indicator for participation in school 
or work, and Djt is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the father is absent from the 
household permanently and 0 otherwise. Note that by definition, Dj1 = 0.16
We estimate equation (1) using a linear probability model (LPM) and cluster the 
standard errors at the municipality level to adjust for potential correlations of household 
decisions within the same municipalities. Although the dependent variable is discrete, in 
our case the main advantage of the linear model over discrete choice models is that it is 
considerably easier to incorporate fixed effects. Another point to note is that, in our 
application, most of the explanatory variables are discrete and take on only a few values, 
strengthening the case for the LPM (Wooldridge 2002, chapter 15). Though a potential 
limitation of the LPM is that it can yield predicted probabilities outside the unit interval, 
in our case this is not a big concern as less than 3% of predictions lie outside the unit 
 If the father 
departed the household between baseline and first follow-up, then Dj2 = 1 and Dj3 = 1; if 
the father departed between first and second follow-ups, then Dj2 = 0 and Dj3 = 1. Xijt is a 
vector of observed time-varying child and household characteristics including a cubic in 
the age of the child, number of siblings of different age categories (0–6, 7–12, 13–17, 
18+), Ijt–1 is a vector of time-varying shocks that occurred in the year prior to the survey, 
including dummies for crop losses, business losses, and illnesses, fj is a household fixed 
effect capturing the effects of unobserved time-invariant household characteristics, δt is a 
survey round dummy, and uijt is an error term that we assume to be iid. The coefficient of 
interest is α2, the effect of absence of the father on the outcome (school or work 
participation). 
interval. Note also that we checked for robustness of our results to this linear 
specification, by estimating a fixed effects logit model (Honoré 2002). The estimates, 
though less precisely estimated as they are based on the subset of children who changed 
their activity over time, point to the same patterns of coefficients as are discussed in the 
main text on the basis of LPMs and are shown in table A2 in the appendix. 
As discussed in section III, an important issue is that our variable of interest, 
father’s permanent absence, may be correlated with unobserved household characteristics 
that have a direct effect on children’s schooling and work. To net out the effects of 
unobserved characteristics that are fixed over time and may lead to spurious correlations 
between father’s permanent absence and children’s outcomes, we use a household fixed 
effects model. We also control for important time-varying shocks to mitigate concerns 
that shocks may be determining both the paternal absence and the child’s outcomes.  
A second issue, also discussed in section III, is that non-random attrition, if 
present, will yield inconsistent parameter estimates. We use a standard correction in a 
two-step sample selection model (Heckman 1979) and estimate the probability that the 
individual does not leave the survey using a probit model: 
(2) 1 2 1 1 3Pr( 1)ijt jt ijt j t ijtS Z X vβ β β η δ− −′= = + + + + +  
where Sijt takes the value 1 if child i from household j does not leave the survey between 
wave t–1 and wave t, and 0 otherwise, Zjt–1 are the instruments used for identification, 
discussed below, Xijt–1 are individual and household characteristics at wave t–1, δt is a 
survey round dummy, iη  is a household-level fixed effect, which may be correlated with 
fj in equation (1), and νijt is an error term. 
The instrument set Zjt–1 includes characteristics of the previous interview - its date 
(day of the month) and whether the survey respondent was the household head or spouse. 
Both may affect the overall experience of the interview and thus willingness to be re-
interviewed but are unlikely to affect the outcomes of interest since they relate to the 
previous interview, which took place at least a year earlier.17
Results 
 The estimates from equation 
(2) are shown in table A3 in the appendix. The instruments are jointly statistically 
significant at the 1% level. We use these estimates to construct the inverse Mills ratio, 
which is appended to the set of control variables in equation (1). The selection correction 
term turns out not to be statistically significant at conventional levels in most cases and 
the estimates change very little when it is included in equation (1). Nonetheless, all 
reported results take into account this selection correction.  
We next turn to the estimates from our equation of interest, equation (1), which 
are shown in table 6. As we observe work (schooling) for children aged 10 (7) and above 
(see section II), we include an additional column containing estimates for schooling for 
the subsample aged 10 and above, to be able to make meaningful comparisons between 
the estimates for work and schooling outcomes.18 We see from column 3 that the 
permanent absence of the father from the household significantly increases participation 
in work, by around 3 percentage points. Interestingly, we see from column 2 that the 
increase in work comes entirely from schooling (and not leisure) since the absence of the 
father has a significant negative effect on school enrollment, of close to 5 percentage 
points.19 Note that the effects on schooling for the full sample, shown in column 1, are 
very similar to those for the restricted sample. The estimated effects are not significantly 
different by gender (columns 4–6). 
{Table 6 about here} 
An important reason why these negative effects on schooling and positive effects 
on work may be expected, discussed in section II, is that households in which the father 
left permanently incur a substantial income reduction. To investigate the extent to which 
the income loss associated with the absence of the father underlies the estimated impacts, 
we interact it with education of the head (as at baseline, i.e. pre-departure), a proxy for 
household income. On the one hand, households with relatively low-educated heads have 
less to lose from a departure through an “income effect”.20
Finally, we checked whether the effects vary depending on the reason for the 
father’s absence, by allowing the effects of death and divorce to be different. A caveat is 
that the incidence of death is very low, affecting just 1% of our sample of households 
(compared with 4.6% for divorce), resulting in its effects being imprecisely estimated. 
The results (available upon request) show that the impacts appear driven mainly by 
 On the other hand, the 
relatively less well-off are more likely to face credit constraints and insurance market 
failures, and to have fewer formal ways to mitigate the impacts of income losses, such 
that they are likely to suffer more from father’s absence. Accordingly, the interaction 
effect can go in both directions and we test it empirically in columns 7–9. We see that the 
detrimental effects of father’s absence on schooling and child labor are driven by 
relatively less well-educated households. This highlights the importance of liquidity 
constraints for these households, which dominates the effect entailed by their relatively 
lower loss of income in the case of departure. 
divorce, though we cannot reject that the coefficient estimates are statistically the same. 
In what follows, we continue to pool these events as we are interested in events that we 
are fairly confident induce permanent income reductions. Another reason for combining 
them is to maintain statistical power given the rarity of the events. 
V. DO CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS HELP PROTECT CHILDREN? 
In this section we investigate whether the effects of the father’s permanent 
absence on children’s outcomes differ depending on whether or not a CCT program is in 
place. We start off by describing the CCT program. We then go on to check whether the 
absence of the father due to divorce has itself been affected by the CCTs, and find no 
evidence that it has. We then estimate whether the CCTs mitigate the adverse effects of 
permanent absence of the father. 
The CCT Program 
In order to evaluate the impacts of the Familias en Acción CCT program, a 
representative stratified sample of municipalities was selected; strata were defined in 
terms of region and an index of infrastructure relating to health and education. Some 
municipalities from the same strata that were excluded from receiving the CCTs, but that 
were as similar as possible to eligible municipalities in terms of population, area, and an 
index of quality of life, were chosen as controls.21 A total of 122 municipalities were 
chosen for the evaluation, of which 70, “eligible for CCTs”, received the CCTs, which 
were phased in during the period we are considering: 26 received CCTs by the time of the 
baseline survey (“early-treat”), 31 by first follow-up (“mid-treat”), and 13 by second 
follow-up (“late-treat”). The final evaluation sample comprised approximately 100 
households randomly selected in each of these 122 municipalities. Attanasio et al. (2010) 
provide an evaluation of the program’s main impacts. 
The CCT Program and Divorce 
Before studying the interaction between the CCTs and permanent absence of the 
father, we address the potential concern that absence of the father - particularly in the 
case of divorce - may itself be affected by the CCTs. Indeed, there is direct evidence of 
positive effects of the PROGRESA CCTs on divorce in Mexico (Bobonis 2011) and 
indirect evidence that the Familias en Acción CCTs may have increased women’s 
bargaining power (Attanasio, Battistin, and Mesnard 2012). Given this, one might expect 
women receiving CCTs to transit more readily out of relationships.  
To estimate the effect of the CCTs on divorce, we use data from the first and 
second follow-ups only (as there is no variation in the outcome, divorce, at baseline - see 
endnote 3).22
(3) 
 We estimate the following regression at the household level on our sample 
of households: 
0 1 2 1 3jt jt jt jt j t jty T X I f uα α α α δ−′ ′= + + + + + +  
pooling t = 2 and t = 3, where yjt is a dummy variable indicating whether the parents 
living in household j divorced between periods t–1 and t, and Tjt is an indicator equal to 1 
if household j lives in a municipality that is receiving CCTs at time t and 0 otherwise. 
Note that Tjt = 1 for {(early-treat = 1 or mid-treat = 1) and t = 2,3} and for {late-treat = 1 
and t = 3}. Xjt are time-varying measures of the composition of children in the household 
in period t, Ijt–1 is a vector of dummies indicating whether the household experienced a 
crop loss, business loss, or illness in period t–1, fj is a household fixed effect, δt is a 
survey round dummy, and ujt is an error term. 
We cannot reject the hypothesis that the cash transfers have had no statistically 
significant effect on divorce (table 7).23
{Table 7 about here} 
 It is thus unlikely that such an effect underlies the 
results we discuss next, which show that receiving CCTs compensates for a father’s absence.  
Interaction Effects 
There is a growing literature on the safety net role played by CCTs in the 
presence of income shocks but, to our knowledge, no work has been done studying the 
case of risk entailed by permanent loss of income. To investigate whether the effects of 
the father’s permanent absence on children’s outcomes differ depending on whether or 
not CCTs are in place, we augment equation (1) to include an interaction between our 
variable of interest, father’s permanent absence, and receiving the CCTs. We thus 
estimate the following model: 
(4) 0 1 2 3 5 1 6*ijt jt jt jt jt ijt jt j t ijty D D T T X I f uα α α α α α δ−′ ′= + + + + + + + +  
where Tjt is equal to 1 if household j lives in a municipality that is receiving CCTs at time 
t and 0 otherwise, and all other notation is as defined in equation (1). As before, Tjt 
reflects the gradual roll-out of the program, so Tjt = 1 for {early-treat = 1 and t = 1,2,3}, 
{mid-treat = 1 and t = 2,3}, and {late-treat = 1 and t = 3}.  
In equation (4), the coefficient of interest, α2, measures the extent to which 
receiving CCTs mitigates the effect of the permanent absence of the father, α1.24 Note 
that the above specification also implicitly controls for pre-program differences in 
outcomes across municipalities that are and are not eligible for the CCTs (through fixed 
effects), which is potentially important given the quasi-experimental setting.  
In municipalities not receiving the CCTs, the permanent absence of the father 
reduces school enrollment and increases child labor, particularly amongst the relatively 
less-educated households (left-hand columns of table 8): this is picked up by the 
coefficient α1 displayed in the first row, which estimates the effect of departure in the 
absence of CCTs. Added to this, the second row, α2, shows that when CCTs are in place, 
these adverse effects are offset (as shown by α1+α2 - which is close to zero and not 
significantly different from zero as shown by the p-values of the test).25
{Table 8 about here} 
 
Finally, as a robustness check, we restrict the comparison to households living in 
municipalities eligible for the CCTs falling within the common support, i.e. the region 
over which treated individuals have a counterpart in the group of controls (according to 
the propensity score). In line with Attanasio et al. (2010), we do this by matching 
treatment and control observations using kernel-weighted propensity score matching, and 
imposing common support by dropping 10% of the treatment observations at which the 
propensity score density of the control observations is the lowest. The results are 
qualitatively similar and shown in table A4 of the appendix. 
The fact that the welfare program provides insurance to protect the very poor 
children from the adverse consequences of a father’s permanent absence is, perhaps, not 
very surprising to the extent that the CCTs received represent a sizeable share of income 
for these households - more than 20% of their monthly total consumption on average (see 
Mesnard 2009) - and that the drop in household labor earnings entailed by father’s 
departure is of a similar magnitude. Moreover, the welfare program is in place on a 
permanent basis, which gives some credence that the insurance it provides will continue 
as long as the child is enrolled in school. Interestingly, this result is somewhat distinct 
from that of De Janvry et al. (2006), who show that PROGRESA did not prevent children 
from working more following shocks due to unemployment and illness of the household 
head, as well as natural disasters in the community, though it fully protected their 
schooling. 
Taken together, our results point towards the existence of credit and insurance 
market imperfections, with adverse implications for children, who play an important role 
in cushioning the household against the income losses entailed by departure of fathers. 
Whilst one cannot rule out the psychological impacts of a parent departing playing a role 
too, we believe they are of secondary importance to the income loss channel. In 
particular, we have no reason to believe that psychological impacts would be stronger 
amongst the less well-educated and they do not lend themselves easily to explaining why 
the CCTs would help mitigate such effects.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper has investigated the link between the permanent absence of the father 
from the household and the school enrollment and work participation of children in rural 
Colombia. We find that absence of the father decreases schooling, by around 5 
percentage points, and increases participation in work by around 3 percentage points. We 
provide evidence that these effects are mainly driven by households with relatively less-
educated heads, which, of the indigent households in our sample, are the very poorest. 
We show that receiving conditional cash transfers offsets these adverse consequences, 
offering the children a form of insurance when the father leaves the household for good. 
This also suggests that the income reduction associated with paternal absence, which is 
tightening liquidity constraints of already very poor households, is the main mechanism 
at play. 
Our results have a number of important policy implications. First, they suggest 
that credit and insurance market failures are potentially important in the context of rural 
Colombia and can contribute to lower human capital accumulation of children. Second, 
an event such as the permanent departure of the father has potentially important 
consequences for the schooling and work of children, in particular those with relatively 
low levels of education, who are particularly vulnerable to permanent income losses 
given insurance market failures. Third, such adverse effects can be offset by well-
designed conditional cash transfer programs targeted at very poor households, which, in 
the case of Colombia, represent on average more than 20% of total household 
consumption and are in place as long as the child is enrolled in school. 
The last finding is the first of this kind, and offers an important agenda for future 
work. An important question is whether it also holds for investments other than schooling 
(such as children’s health and nutrition) and in other contexts and environments. Another 
question is whether this should be taken into account in the design of safety nets and their 
targeting to lone parents, as it may also have the unintended consequence of promoting 
single parenthood. A final thought is on the particular relevance of these findings for sub-
Saharan Africa, which has seen a dramatic rise in orphanhood due to the prevalence of 
HIV/AIDS, with estimates suggesting 12% of all children are orphaned (UNICEF 2006). 
Families and communities have been sharing the burden of this, and it may be time for 
government support to be put in place to help households cope. 
APPENDIX 
{Tables A.1, A.2, A.3 & A.4 about here} 
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TABLE 1. School and work participation, by age, survey and gender 
    Males     Females   
              
              
Age at  Baseline First  Second  Baseline First  Second  
baseline   (+1 yr) 
(+3.5 
yrs)   (+1 yr) 
(+3.5 
yrs) 
              
    
School 
enrolment     
School 
enrolment   
    %     %   
7 0.904 0.928 0.963 0.922 0.953 0.970 
8 0.935 0.951 0.933 0.961 0.959 0.947 
9 0.952 0.943 0.895 0.966 0.960 0.918 
10 0.932 0.907 0.813 0.958 0.950 0.867 
11 0.917 0.884 0.764 0.935 0.901 0.835 
12 0.856 0.782 0.675 0.897 0.859 0.786 
13 0.791 0.755 0.577 0.832 0.791 0.633 
14 0.660 0.620 0.457 0.740 0.728 0.536 
N 6090 5726 5033 5589 5266 4482 
              
  Work participation Work participation 
    %     %   
10 0.021 0.019 0.083 0.010 0.006 0.045 
11 0.031 0.050 0.132 0.012 0.025 0.057 
12 0.057 0.093 0.209 0.029 0.042 0.117 
13 0.109 0.148 0.284 0.057 0.086 0.143 
14 0.213 0.285 0.371 0.091 0.169 0.203 
N 3672 4233 5022 3265 3870 4480 
Notes: Work includes full-time paid and unpaid activities and look for work as a main 
activity. Figures in bold (italics) denote ages corresponding to post-compulsory 
schooling. Note that +1 yr (3.5 yrs) means 1 yr (3.5 yrs) after the baseline survey. N 
denotes the number of individuals (aged 7-14 at baseline) present in the survey listed 
at top of column. Schooling observed for children aged ≥7; work observed for children 
aged ≥10.  
  
TABLE 2. Comparison of baseline (pre-departure) characteristics across 
households that do and do not experience subsequent departure 
 
 
Characteristic, Baseline  ↓ 
Permanent absence of father 
(D)   
  D=1 D=0 p-value   
Age of household head 42.88 42.21 0.182   
Age of spouse 37.81 37.14 0.110   
Education of head         
   None 0.282 0.230 0.015   
   Some (complete/incomplete primary) 0.535 0.638 0.000   
   High (incomplete secondary or more) 0.181 0.132 0.004   
Education of spouse         
   None 0.199 0.195 0.846   
   Some (complete/incomplete primary) 0.633 0.661 0.238   
   High (Incomplete secondary or more)   0.168 0.144 0.171   
Household composition         
   Ave # of kids ≤ 6 0.388 0.467 0.011   
   Ave #  of boys 7-11 0.727 0.738 0.775   
   Ave #  of girls 7-11 0.718 0.684 0.366   
   Ave #  of boys 12-17 0.635 0.641 0.890   
   Ave #  of girls 12-17 0.581 0.590 0.809   
   Ave # of female adults 1.232 1.244 0.708   
   Ave # of male adults 1.366 1.396 0.432   
School enrolment rate of          
7-14 yr olds in household 0.924 0.899 0.057   
Household monthly consumption  421286 441994 0.085   
Program area 0.700 0.682 0.453   
Altitude 574.45 601.90 0.451   
          
N 426 5720     
Notes: Sample consists of households where both parents are present at baseline 
and there is a 7-14 year old. N = number of households at baseline. P-values are 
based on standard errors clustered at the municipality level. Figures in bold in 
column (4) indicate that the figures in columns (2) and (3) are significantly from each 
other at the 5 per cent level or less. 
  
  
TABLE 3. Common Trends: Schooling and Income 
  School enrolment
A
   
      
Year = 2002 0.0343**   
  (0.005)   
Absence * Year=2002 0.0238   
  (0.0143)   
N
1
 11679    
      
      
  Per capita income
B
   
Year = 2000 0.498**   
  (0.111)   
Year = 2001 1.1019**   
  (0.1432)   
Absence * Year = 2000 -0.0845   
  (0.4641)   
Absence * Year = 2001 0.6144   
  (0.6028)   
N
2
 5066   
      
Notes: 
A
 Dependent variable is school enrolment.  Estimates from 
household fixed effects model;  also control for quadratic in child age, 
gender (female=1). Reference year = 2001. 
B
 Dependent variable is 
per capita household labour income. Estimates from household fixed 
effects model.  Reference year = 1999. N
1
 is the number of children in 
the sample at baseline with non-missing school enrolment data. N
2
 is 
the number of households in the sample at baseline that report 
income retrospectively for 1999, 2000 and 2001. Standard errors, 
clustered at municipality level, in parentheses.  
  
TABLE 4. Correlation between divorce and shocks in previous 
period 
    Divorce (t) 
Crop loss (t-1)   -0.0033 
    (0.0045) 
Business loss (t-1)   0.0205 
    (0.0181) 
Illness (t-1)   -0.0061 
    (0.0071) 
      
P-value for joint significance   0.55 
N   5796 
Notes: Dependent variable is divorce. Reference year=2001. Estimates 
from household fixed effects model pooling first and second follow-ups; 
also control for child composition and time dummies. N is the number of 
households remaining in the sample by first follow-up. Standard errors, 
clustered at the municipality level, in parentheses. 
  
TABLE 5. Comparison of characteristics across households that do and do not attrit 
at any time after baseline 
Baseline Characteristics   
Did  
not attrit   
Did 
attrit   p-value difference   
                
Age of head   42.1123   42.3617   0.5057   
Age of spouse   37.1413   37.4586   0.2987   
Head no education   0.2309   0.2497   0.2263   
Spouse no education   0.1927   0.2120   0.1889   
Head some education   0.6321   0.6208   0.5251   
Spouse some education   0.6579   0.6655   0.6668   
Head high education   0.1365   0.1260   0.4047   
Spouse high education   0.1493   0.1225   0.0398   
Treated area   0.6844   0.6756   0.6064   
Altitude   577.69   726.43   0.0000   
Crop loss at first survey   0.1339   0.1249   0.4708   
Owns house   0.6466   0.5321   0.0000   
                
N   5289   857       
Notes: Sample consists of households where both parents are present at baseline and 
there is a 7-14 year old. N = number of households at baseline. P-values are based on 
standard errors clustered at the municipality level. Figures in bold in column (4) indicate 
that the figures in columns (2) and (3) are significantly from each other at the 5 per cent 
level or less. 
 
TABLE 6. Marginal effects of the father’s absence on children’s schooling and work          
  School School Work School School Work School School Work 
  Overall Restricted Overall Restricted Overall Restricted 
                    
Permanent Absence -0.0412* -0.0484* 0.0301+ -0.0422+ -0.0486+ 0.0361 -0.0556** -0.0641** 0.0360+ 
  (0.0172) (0.0216) (0.0167) (0.0233) (0.0289) (0.0233) (0.0193) (0.0234) (0.0183) 
Permanent Absence * Girl 
   
0.0021 0.0005 -0.0122 
     
   
(0.0241) (0.0275) (0.0245) 
   Permanent Absence *  High Educated Head 
      
0.0742* 0.0851* -0.0319 
  
      
(0.0313) (0.0367) (0.0295) 
  
         N 32186 24531 24531 32186 24531 24531 32186 24531 24531 
Notes: Marginal effects from a fixed effects linear probability model reported (equation (1)). Also control for absence of father from household 
for unknown reason, absence of both parents, time dummies, cubic in child age, sibling composition, dummies for crop, illness and business 
shocks, inverse mills ratio computed as in equation (2) (see Table A3). High educated = 1 if incomplete secondary or more at baseline, 0 
otherwise. N is the number of children in the sample pooled across three waves. 6146 households are in our initial sample, from which 426 
fathers have subsequently departed. Schooling observed for all children in sample, i.e. ≥7 ('overall' sample); work observed for children ≥10 
('restricted' sample). Robust standard errors clustered at municipality level in parentheses. + significant at 10%; *significant at 5%; ** significant 
at 1%.  
 
TABLE 7. Marginal Effects of CCTs on Divorce 
    Pr (Divorce = 1) 
CCTs   0.0024   
    (0.0082)   
Time = 2   -0.0286   
     (0.0039)   
        
N   5796   
        
Notes: Marginal effects from equation from a 
fixed effects linear probability model reported 
(equation (3)). Pools first and second follow-
ups. Also control for child composition, 
dummies for crop, illness and       
business shocks, inverse mills ratio computed 
as in equation (2) (see Table A3). N is the 
number of households that have not attrited by 
first follow-up. Robust standard errors 
clustered at municipality level in parentheses. 
 
  
TABLE 8. Cushioning effects of CCTs: Marginal effects on schooling and 
work 
 
  Low Ed All 
  School School Work School School Work 
  Overall Restricted  Overall Restricted  
Permanent Absence (α1) -0.103** -0.114* 0.0782* -0.0801** -0.0919* 0.0694* 
  (0.0341) (0.0437) (0.0355) (0.0284) (0.0376) (0.0300) 
Permanent Absence  
* CCTs
 
 (α2) 0.0818* 0.0833+ -0.0687+ 0.0566+ 0.0615 -0.0542+ 
  (0.0381) (0.0472) (0.0356) (0.0330) (0.0420) (0.0307) 
CCTs
 
(α3) 0.0143 0.0057 -0.0262** 0.0121 0.0053 -0.0257** 
  (0.0123) (0.0148) (0.0096) (0.0112) (0.0134) (0.00902) 
Time = 2 0.1080 0.1520 -0.2010* 0.0783 0.1180 -0.1500+ 
  (0.0957) (0.105) (0.0847) (0.0872) (0.0964) (0.0773) 
Time = 3 0.0261 0.0689 -0.148+ -0.0025 0.0347 -0.1010 
  (0.1010) (0.1100) (0.0889) (0.0927) (0.1020) (0.0809) 
  
      P-value (α1 + α2)= 0 0.3498 0.2636 0.6224 0.2633 0.2379 0.3854 
N 28027 21464 21464 32186 24531 24531 
Notes: Marginal effects from a fixed effects linear probability model reported (equation (4)). 
Also control for absence of father for unknown reason, absence of both parents, cubic in child 
age, sibling composition, dummies for crop, illness and business shocks, inverse mills ratio 
computed as in equation (2) (see Table A3). CCTs indicates whether the household lives in a 
municipality that is receiving CCTs at time of survey. N is the number of children in the sample 
pooled across three waves. 6146 households are in initial sample, from which 426 fathers have 
subsequently departed. Schooling observed for all children in sample, i.e. ≥7 ('overall' sample); 
work observed for children ≥10 ('restricted' sample). Robust standard errors clustered at 
municipality level in parentheses. + significant at 10%; *significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE A1. Marginal effects of paternal death and divorce on transfers received 
by household  
    Institutional Monetary In-Kind   
  
 
          
  
 
Death -1,317 16,809* 22,596   
  
 
  (8680) (7512) (14788)   
  
 
Divorce 1,512 17,704** 8,484   
  
 
  (4294) (4106) (7967)   
  
 
  
   
  
  
 
N 6,069   
  
 
Notes: N is number of households at baseline for which we observe 
transfers. Complete data on transfers missing for 77 of the sample of 
6146 households. Pools baseline, first and second follow-ups. We trim the 
top 1% of outliers in each period. Each column represents a separate 
regression. Also control for household fixed effects, absence of father for 
unknown reason, absence of both parents, time dummies, household 
child composition, dummies for crop, illness and business shocks, inverse 
mills ratio computed as in equation (2) (see Table A3). Robust standard 
errors clustered at municipality level in parentheses. Robust standard 
errors clustered at municipality level in parentheses.  + significant at 10%; 
*significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.   
  
 
  
TABLE A2. Marginal effects of the father’s absence on children’s schooling and work            
Estimates from Conditional Logit Model                   
  School School Work School School Work School School Work 
  Overall Restricted Overall Restricted Overall Restricted 
                    
Permanent Absence -0.507* -0.596* 0.550+ -0.488* -0.579* 0.661+ -0.555* -0.662** 0.515 
  (0.223) (0.248) (0.309) (0.245) (0.277) (0.349) (0.231) (0.250) (0.317) 
Permanent Absence * Girl       -0.0423 -0.0367 -0.241       
        (0.267) (0.300) (0.376)       
Permanent Absence *  High Educated Head             0.555 0.711 0.471 
          
 
  (0.847) (0.855) (1.007) 
                    
N
1
 4284 3895 2536 4284 3895 2604 4284 3895 2604 
N
2
 1829 1661 1064 1829 1661 1075 1829 1661 1075 
Notes: Marginal effects from a conditional logit model reported (equation (1)) with household fixed effects. Additional controls include 
control for absence of father for unknown reason, absence of both parents, time dummies, cubic in child age, sibling composition, dummies 
for crop, illness, and business shocks, inverse mills ratio computed as in equation (2) (see Table A3). High Educated is equal to 1 if incomplete 
secondary or more at baseline, 0 otherwise. N
1
 (N
2
) is the number of children (households) in the sample that (contain a child that) switch 
outcome status at least once, pooled across three waves. Non-switcher children drop out of the conditional likelihood function. Schooling 
observed for all children in sample, i.e. ≥7 ('overall' sample); work observed for children ≥10 ('restricted' sample) . Robust standard errors 
clustered at municipality level in parentheses. + significant at 10%; *significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  
  
TABLE A3. Probability of not leaving the sample, marginal effects 
  
Dep vble=1 if stay in sample, 0 
otherwise   
Female 0.0057+   
  (0.0031)   
Time = 2 0.0367**   
  (0.0071)   
Owns house 0.0544*   
  (0.0213)   
Urban 0.0075   
  (0.0069)   
Day of month 1 -0.0478+   
  (0.0288)   
Day of month 2 -0.0385   
  (0.0318)   
Day of month 3 -0.0583+   
  (0.0349)   
Day of month 4 -0.0287   
  (0.0309)   
Day of month 5 -0.0011   
  (0.0228)   
Day of month 6 -0.0410   
  (0.0265)   
Day of month 7 -0.0050   
  (0.0246)   
Day of month 8 -0.0593+   
  (0.0331)   
Day of month 9 -0.0466   
  (0.0351)   
Day of month 10 -0.0130   
  (0.0263)   
Day of month 11 -0.0132   
  (0.0227)   
Day of month 12 -0.0771*   
  (0.0392)   
Day of month 13 -0.0645+   
  (0.0378)   
Day of month 14 -0.0581   
  (0.0356)   
Day of month 15 -0.0514   
  (0.0374)   
Day of month 16 -0.0826*   
  (0.0361)   
Day of month 17 -0.0311   
  (0.0335)   
Day of month 18 -0.0165   
  (0.0290)   
Day of month 19 -0.0524   
  (0.0366)   
Day of month 20 -0.0584   
  (0.0414)   
Day of month 21 -0.0471   
  (0.0361)   
Day of month 22 -0.0319   
  (0.0323)   
Day of month 23 -0.0429   
  (0.0341)   
Day of month 24 -0.0435   
  (0.0322)   
Day of month 25 -0.0194   
  (0.0234)   
Day of month 26 -0.0439   
  (0.0364)   
Day of month 27 -0.0456   
  (0.0308)   
Day of month 28 -0.0135   
  (0.0249)   
Day of month 29 -0.0034   
  (0.0234)   
Day of month 30 0.0078   
  (0.0224)   
Respondent = head 0.0132   
  (0.0188)   
Respondent = spouse 0.0597*   
  (0.0272)   
      
p-value of joint significance of 
instruments 0.0000   
      
N 11679   
Notes: N is the number of children in the sample at baseline with non-
missing school enrolment data. Day of month = dummy variables for day 
baseline interview took place. Robust standard errors clustered at 
municipality level in parentheses. + significant at 10%; *significant at 5%; 
** significant at 1%.    
  
TABLE A4. Marginal effects of the father’s absence on children’s  
schooling and work, common support only     
  School Work 
  Overall Restricted   
Permanent Absence (α1) -0.102** -0.106* 0.0682+ 
  (0.0373) (0.0477) (0.0367) 
Permanent Absence * CCTs1  (α2) 0.0881* 0.0829 -0.0658+ 
  (0.0398) (0.0506) (0.0368) 
CCTs
1 
(α3) 0.0145 0.006 -0.0224* 
  (0.0125) (0.0146) (0.0103) 
Time = 2 0.121 0.17 -0.222* 
  (0.101) (0.11) (0.087) 
Time = 3 0.0371 0.0856 -0.167+ 
  (0.106) (0.114) (0.091) 
  
   N 24982 18972 18972 
Notes: See notes to Table 8.  Note further that we match treatment and control 
observations using kernel-weighted propensity score matching, and impose 
common support by dropping 10% of the treatment observations at which the 
propensity score density of the control observations is the lowest. 
                                                  
NOTES 
*
 Emla Fitzsimons (corresponding author) is Co-Director of the Centre for the Evaluation 
of Development Policy (EDePo) at the Institute for Fiscal Studies; her email address is 
emla_f@ifs.org.uk. Alice Mesnard is Reader at City University, Senior Research 
Economist at the Institute for Fiscal Studies, and Research Affiliate of the CEPR; her 
email address is Alice.Mesnard.1@city.ac.uk. The authors are grateful to participants at 
the IFS, CMPO, World Bank, and 3ie-LIDC Seminar Series and to participants in the 
NEUDC conference for comments. They thank Orazio Attanasio, Rajeev Dehejia, Ian 
Preston, Dominique van de Walle, and Marcos Vera-Hernández for useful comments. 
They also thank the Editor and two anonymous referees for very helpful suggestions. 
Funding from ESRC, grant number RES-000-22-1742, is gratefully acknowledged. All 
errors are the responsibility of the authors. 
1 Note that departure of the mother is also an important issue and may have 
different effects from those stressed in this paper. However, there is insufficient variation 
in the data to allow us to look at this. 
2 An absent but living father can visit and influence the children’s upbringing in a 
way that a deceased father obviously cannot. On the other hand, relations with the absent 
parent’s family might also be very different in the two cases, perhaps more supportive in 
cases of early death of the father than in cases of acrimonious separation. Moreover, 
transfers from the father or in-laws may compensate in different ways depending on the 
                                                                                                                                                 
reason for departure. However, in our data, transfers are very similar regardless of 
whether departure is due to death or divorce, as table A1 later attests to. 
3 We start with a sample of households where both parents are married so, by 
definition, fathers are all present at baseline. 
4 This sample selection criterion means that we retain 9,187 out of 11,502 
households. The reason we do not keep mono-parental households is that the departure of 
the father (if present) in such households would raise additional issues, which would be 
difficult to disentangle.  
5 School enrollment is defined on the basis of whether the child is registered at 
school in the academic year corresponding to the survey. Work participation is equal to 1 
if the child’s main activity in the week before the survey is reported to be any of work, 
household chores (paid and unpaid), or looking for work. We note that our main results 
are similar if we exclude unpaid household chores.  
6 The school system in Colombia operates as follows. Compulsory education is 
free and lasts for nine years; it consists of basic primary (educación básica primaria, five 
years, ages 7 through 11) and basic secondary (educación básica secundaria, four years, 
ages 12 through 15). The secondary school system also includes the middle secondary 
cycle (educación media, two years, ages 16 and 17). Successful completion of studies 
leads to the Bachillerato. Students must pass an entrance examination for access to 
universities. 
7 Note that absent fathers are not being ‘replaced’ in households, at least in the 
3.5-year span of our surveys: whilst the number of male adults is lower by almost 1 in 
                                                                                                                                                 
households that experience departure, the number of female adults is the same, as is the 
number of children. 
8 We also checked that, considered separately, they do not have significantly 
different impacts (see section IV). 
9 In an additional 1% of households, both the father and mother have left the 
household for an unknown, possibly temporary, reason; there is also a small percentage 
(1.2%) of households in which the father has left for an unknown reason, but the mother 
has remained in the household and reports being married, so we assume that these are 
temporary departures. These are not the main variables of interest but we control for them 
throughout the analysis. 
10 If we do not control for adult composition, the difference is larger, at around 
34%, which we would expect since departure of the father decreases the number of adults 
in the household. Further, we see this as a lower bound of the magnitude of the departure 
effect in terms of total household adult earnings, as it includes labor supply responses to 
it, which are likely to cushion the potential adverse effects on income. This figure 
excludes earnings from children to mitigate this problem. 
11 Table A1 shows that the total value of additional transfers received by the 
households after the paternal departure (institutional, monetary, and in-kind) is less than 
50,000 pesos per annum, compared with an average monthly total household 
consumption in excess of 420,000 pesos at baseline. Nonetheless, these responses by the 
extended family or friends may also contribute to explaining why household consumption 
does not drop by as much as household labor income, as noted earlier. 
                                                                                                                                                 
12 However, if this were the case, then we would rather expect to see it having a 
positive impact on children, whereas we in fact observe the contrary. It must also be 
acknowledged that departure of the father due to death may not be a random event, 
though this is much less of a concern.  
13 In the lower panel of table 3, the coefficient associated with the interaction of 
absence of the father with year of survey 2000 which is negative, is very small in 
magnitude and has a very large standard error, so is of no concern. 
14 Attrition at the individual level is extremely rare, at less than 1%. 
15 It is comparable to the attrition rate of 6% between the baseline and follow-up 
surveys for the evaluation of the Bono de Desarrollo CCT program in Ecuador, which is 
considered “low”, and just under the attrition rate of 15% over four years in Nicaragua 
for the evaluation of the Red de Protección Social CCT program, which is considered 
“reasonably low”. It is slightly higher than the rate for the PROGRESA program, which 
was around 6% over the first three years of the program and considered to be “very low”. 
(Fiszbein et al. 2009)  
16 As discussed in section II, our sample is restricted to households in which the 
father is present at baseline. We only observe departures after baseline. 
17 Attrition in our sample is predominantly at the household level. Moreover, 
very few households (3.7% in the entire sample) have migrated out of their village of 
residence and additional resources have been invested into tracking them (Mesnard 
2009), so attrition is mostly due to non-willingness to answer.  
18 We retain estimates for the full sample in order to improve statistical power. 
                                                                                                                                                 
19 This suggests that child labor and schooling are strong substitutes, in contrast 
to the finding of Ravallion and Wodon (2000) that increases in schooling in Bangladesh 
following a welfare program only partially come from decreased child labor. 
20 Similarly, if paternal education is positively correlated with paternal quality as 
a figurehead / role model, then one would expect the loss of a high-educated father to 
involve the loss of a more positive impact on the child’s life.  
21 In order to be eligible to qualify for the program, municipalities had to satisfy 
four criteria: (i) have less than 100,000 inhabitants and not be a departmental capital, (ii) 
have basic education and health infrastructure, (iii) have a bank, and (iv) have relatively 
up-to-date welfare lists at the municipality administrative office. The evaluation design 
was carried out by a consortium led by the Institute for Fiscal Studies and that included 
the authors of this paper. 
22 This also means that the identification of the effect of the CCTs on divorce 
comes from the roll-out of the program to late-treat areas at time 3. 
23 As an additional check, we compared the characteristics of households that 
divorce, across areas eligible for the CCTs and control areas, and found them to be very 
similar for both types of area.  
24 Note that due to the gradual phasing-in of the CCTs, the “early-treat” 
municipalities do not contribute to identifying α3, the impact of the CCTs, as there are no 
pre-program data collected for these municipalities. However, we retain them in the 
analysis as they do contribute to identifying α1 and α2. 
                                                                                                                                                 
25 The table also shows that the effect of the CCTs on children in our sample who 
are not affected by paternal absence, given by α3, is to increase school enrollment and 
reduce child labor. Although the effect on schooling is not significant, this is most likely 
due to the fact that the early-treat municipalities do not contribute to the identification of 
the CCT effect, unlike in Attanasio et al. (2010), which contains the general analysis of 
the impacts of the program. 
